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Uncertainty defines our times. Whether it is in relation to climate change, disease outbreaks, financial 
volatility, natural disasters or political settlements, every media headline seems to assert that things are 
uncertain, and increasingly so. Uncertainty, where we do not know the probabilities of either likelihoods 
or outcomes, is different to risk, the implications of which are explored in this paper through five 
different ways of thinking about uncertainty, derived from highly diverse literatures encompassing 
societal, political, cultural, practice and individual perspectives.  
 
The paper continues by examining how these perspectives relate to four domains: finance and banking; 
critical infrastructures; disease outbreaks and climate change; natural hazards and disasters. Reflecting 
on these experiences, the paper argues that embracing uncertainty raises some fundamental 
challenges. It means questioning simple, linear perspectives on modernity and progress. It means 
rethinking expertise and including diverse knowledges in deliberations about the future. It means 
understanding how uncertainties emerge in social, political and economic contexts, and how 
uncertainties affect different people, depending on class, gender, race, age and other dimensions of 
social difference. And, if uncertainty is not reducible to probabilistic risk, it means a radically different 
approach to governance; one that rejects control-oriented, technocratic approaches in favour of more 
tentative, adaptive, hopeful and caring responses.  
 
The paper concludes by asking whether we can learn from those who live with and from uncertainty – 
including pastoralists in marginal settings – as part of a wider conversation about embracing 





Uncertainty defines our times. Every media headline seems to assert that things are uncertain, and 
increasingly so – be it climate change, disease outbreaks, economic conditions or political settlements. 
Helga Nowotny, in her book, The Cunning of Uncertainty, argues that uncertainty is ‘written into the 
script of life’ (2015: 1). Many years before, Mary Douglas (1986a: 172) argued that ‘…unwrapping the 
gifts we receive from randomness, thriving on the cusp of uncertainty and knowing when is the right 
moment to act, delay or forgo action are different ways of embracing uncertainty’. But how should we 
understand ‘uncertainty’, and why does it matter? Are our societies equipped for responding to 
seemingly accelerating uncertainties across domains?  
The conventional, managerial and technocratic approach is to construct challenges as risks – where the 
probabilities of future outcomes are known, or at least can be estimated. The paraphernalia of risk 
assessment and management are familiar, derived from engineering approaches. These are good for 
some challenges – such as the designing of a bridge or road – but not for others. A risk-focused approach 
implies the future is controllable and that a modernist vision of progress is achievable, if only effective 
science and technocratic-institutional control are applied.  
But when future outcomes are not known, when there are disputes about what outcomes are desired 
and when indeterminacy prevails in complex, interconnected systems, then such approaches fail. To 
assume that they will work is potentially dangerous. In this wider, and much more common condition 
of uncertainty – or more broadly ‘incertitude’ – greater humility and vigilance are required. Knowledge 
about uncertainty is co-constituted with social, institutional and political orders, so it really matters how 
we understand and respond to the multiple conditions of uncertainty. This has huge implications for the 
practices of science, management and policy, with consequences for how institutions and governance 
arrangements function. A linear, hierarchical, modernist vision of progress is thus challenged, opening 
up questions about how we navigate the world in new ways in the context of uncertainty.  
This paper offers a necessarily highly selective review of different ways of thinking about uncertainty, 
drawing on a range of disciplinary perspectives and explorations in different fields.1 It argues for a 
tighter analytical differentiation of ‘uncertainty’ and a dissection of its multiple dimensions, and 
suggests that new thinking and practice is required for living with and from uncertainty (Scoones 1994; 
Krätli Schareika 2010). Unlike what has happened too often in responses to challenges of resilience and 
sustainability, this means going beyond a technocratic managerialism to a more fundamental recasting 
of practices, institutions and policies that fundamentally challenge simplistic visions of modernising 
progress.  
In order to achieve such a reframing, the paper argues that looking across fields is both illuminating and 
instructive. Here I reflect on lessons from responding to volatility in banking and finance networks; 
managing reliability in critical infrastructures; thinking about early warning and preparedness around 
infectious disease outbreaks and reflecting on the representation of vulnerability in climate and disaster 
                                                          
1 This paper has been written as a background review for the European Research Council-funded PASTRES project 
(Pastoralism, Uncertainty, Resilience: Global Lessons from the Margins, www.pastres.org), and particularly as part 
of the training programme for the six PhD students who have joined the project. The project is exploring how 
pastoralists live with and from uncertainty in Qinghai in China, Sardinia in Italy and Isiolo in Kenya, as well as 
western India, southern Ethiopia and southern Tunisia. Lessons from pastoralists, we argue, may help others 
working in other domains to develop more effective responses to uncertain contexts. This paper is a first part of 
trying to develop a conversation across domains, and is an input into the ESRC STEPS Centre’s symposium on ‘The 
Politics of Uncertainty’ in July 2019.  
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responses. Such diverse fields offer important convergent insights that, together, push us towards a 
fundamental rethinking of conventional responses to uncertainty.  
Further, the paper argues that it is also crucial to gain insights from those who have long confronted 
environmental, market and governance uncertainties – such as pastoralists living in marginal areas. If 
modernist practices and institutions forged with an expectation of certainty – or at least risk 
management – have failed, then how can alternative, culturally embedded forms help us to rethink? 
In the next section, the paper asks ‘what is uncertainty?’ and offers a set of reflections on definitions, 
before posing some guiding questions. The following sections introduce five ways of thinking about 
uncertainty, derived from a review of the voluminous literature on the theme. Sources come from 
across different disciplinary traditions that are frequently not brought into conversation with each 
other. Next, the paper turns to examining responses to uncertainty in different domains – as mentioned, 
in finance and banking; critical infrastructures; disease outbreaks; and climate and disaster risk 
reduction. A set of emerging overarching themes are then highlighted, before the paper concludes with 
a brief reflection on some core characteristics of what embracing uncertainty might mean in practice.  
2. What is Uncertainty? 
There are long traditions of reflecting on uncertainty. These include philosophical traditions of 
scepticism and creativity, ranging from Socrates to Erasmus to de Montaigne (Ravetz 2008); the 
quantum view of physics, from Heisenberg to Schrodinger (Buckman 2008); and perspectives in 
economics, from Keynes to von Hayek to Marx (Diamond and Rothschild 2014). In different ways, all 
point to the challenges of human control and technocratic management, and so confront a Cartesian 
and modernist rationalism. Nobel prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman neatly captured the 
ambitions of science to embrace uncertainty:  
It is imperative in science to doubt; it is absolutely necessary, for progress in science, to have 
uncertainty as a fundamental part of your inner nature. To make progress in understanding, we 
must remain modest and allow that we do not know. Nothing is certain or proved beyond all 
doubt. You investigate for curiosity, because it is unknown, not because you know the answer.  
(Feynman 1956/2001: 247–8) 
This sentiment is echoed in biologist Stuart Firestein’s book, Ignorance: How It Drives Science. ‘Real 
science’, he says ‘is a revision in progress, always. It proceeds in fits and starts of ignorance. Being a 
scientist requires having faith in uncertainty, finding pleasure in mystery, and learning to cultivate 
doubt.’ (2012:9) 
2.1.  Statistics, Economics and Management: From Risk to Uncertainty? 
Despite the frequent hailing of doubt and uncertainty as central to scientific creativity, the practice and 
application of science and technocracy can be quite different. As Ian Hacking (1990) argues in The 
Taming of Chance, statistics emerged as a mechanism of control through surveys, censuses and 
regulatory disciplining. The origins of states, as the term implies, is rooted in statistics, and therefore in 
counting, predicting and controlling (Porter 1986). In ‘Seeing like a State’, James Scott (1998) argues 
that the state requires metrics, planning and control systems. Settled city states in these ways organise 
to fend off the violence and volatility of the outsider ‘barbarians’ (Scott 2017). State-craft is bound up 
in creating certainties where often there were none.  
In economics, Frank Knight (1921/2000: 311) long ago pointed to the difference between uncertainty 
and risk, in relation to the ability to assign probabilities to outcomes. He argued:  
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…profit arises out of the inherent absolute unpredictability of things, out of the sheer, brute 
fact that the results of human activity cannot be anticipated, and then only in so far as even a 
probability calculation in regard to them is impossible and meaningless.  
In his landmark General Theory, John Maynard Keynes (1936) argued that economic models are 
inadequate, so we must rely on the ‘animal spirits’ of intuition and judgement for decision-making:  
Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the 
characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend on 
spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or 
economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of 
which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal 
spirits—a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a 
weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.  
(1936: 161–2) 
Friedrich von Hayek also accepted the fundamentals of uncertainty, but argued that market relations 
were the best route to resolution. Kenneth Arrow equally argued for the centrality of uncertainty 
considerations in economic decisions (Arrow 1963; Arrow and Lind 1970; Machina 1987), reflecting 
later: ‘Vast ills have followed a belief in certainty… When developing policy… caution is needed because 
we cannot predict the consequences’ (Arrow 1992: 46). Marxist economic theory of course accepted 
irreducible uncertainty as central to dynamic, dialectic change, the result of an ever-lasting process of 
agitation derived from competition among different classes and capital (Dunn and West 2013).  
In other words, before the rise of a narrowly defined mathematical economics, premised on equilibrium 
thinking, uncertainty as a concept – even if deployed in different ways – was central to economic theory, 
and to wider, applied policy thinking (Akerlof 1970). Yet, standard economics textbooks rarely mention 
uncertainty and, if they do, they conflate risk with uncertainty.  
However, changes may be afoot. Popular interventions in recent years have started to argue for the 
distinguishing of signal and noise (Silver 2012), the importance of ‘fat-tailed’ distributions (Taleb 2012), 
black swan events (Taleb 2007), and, for some, even the rejection of probabilistic thinking altogether 
(Ayache 2010). This has, in turn, been combined with a greater appreciation of the problems of poor 
applications of conventional statistics and inappropriate risk calculations (Freeman and Spiegelhalter 
2018). More broadly, such themes as the ‘architecture of error’ (Hughes 2014), ‘being wrong’ (Schultz 
2011) and the ‘adventures of serendipity’ (Merton and Barbar 2011) have been highlighted.  
The ongoing debates between objective and subjective approaches to statistical analysis highlight the 
importance of understanding uncertainty. In the frequentist approaches of traditional ‘normal’ 
statistics, the assumption is that likelihoods can be assigned, as in the random numbers generated by 
the rolling of a dice. This ‘aleatory’ approach to uncertainty is contrasted with an ‘epistemic’ approach, 
where probabilities express a ‘degree of belief’ in an event, which may change as learning takes place, 
and new information is accumulated. This Bayesian approach, where beliefs, subjective perceptions and 
learning are important, provides a major challenge to frequentist assumptions in statistics. In Bayesian 
approaches, alternative models, and so understandings of uncertainty, emerge through incremental, 
sequential learning processes. Most systems do not replicate dice-throwing or simple gambling games 
and there are always unknown parameters to learn about, with prior distributions influencing future 
outcomes (O’Hagan 2004). This matters because models that take different approaches may result in 
very different recommendations about engineering safety, for example (Der Kiureghian and Ditleven 
2009). Sequential statistical analysis therefore allows new experiments or models to be designed based 
on previous experiences, as beliefs are updated. Building on such insights, fuzzy logic approaches, agent-
based modelling and dynamic, non-equilibrium analysis are increasingly used (Lunn et al. 2012).  
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Of course, practical appreciations of the implications of uncertainty, complexity and the importance of 
learning have long been evident. Albert Hirschman (1971), for example, in his explorations of the 
administration and management of development in Latin America was perhaps the most articulate 
exponent. He argued against narrow, disciplinary approaches and for greater latitude, with a ‘bias for 
hope’ and a ‘passion for the possible’, based on diverse experimentation, learning from history and 
sequential decision-making. Such perspectives have become popular more recently in arguments for 
‘adaptive management’ of ‘complex socio-ecological systems’ (Walters 1986; Ludwig et al. 1993; 
Gunderson 1999; Folke et al. 2005), as well as ‘experimental governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010; Evans 
2011; Hilden et al. 2017; see below), and a wider advocacy of ‘complexity-aware development’ 
(Ramalingam et al. 2014). 
2.2. Constructing Uncertainty: A Politics of Knowledge 
Constructivist perspectives on science and policy have long argued for the necessity of embracing 
indeterminate contexts, and moving beyond simple risk framings towards subjective perspectives on 
uncertainty (Wynne 1992a; Stirling 1999). This has important consequences for expertise, law and 
regulation (Jasanoff 1987). A ‘post-normal’ science, Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz (1990) argue, is 
required when conditions are uncertain, values are in dispute, the stakes are high and decisions are 
urgent. This entails engaging an ‘extended peer community’ to be involved in scientific disputes and 
policymaking (Ravetz 1999).  
Andy Stirling (1999) contrasts risk, where the probabilities of both outcomes and their likelihoods are 
known (or are deemed unproblematic), with uncertainty, where likelihoods are unknown, as well as 
ambiguity, where outcomes are contested, and ignorance, where, in the words of former US Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, ‘There are unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know’.2 
The simple heuristic presented in Figure 2.1 provides a useful unpacking of what Stirling identifies as 
four dimensions of ‘incertitude’. These dimensions are states of knowledge, not states of nature. They 
are views about the world, from particular perspectives, not statements about how the world is (Stirling 
2019). This has profound implications for policy and practice, as will be explored below.  
Figure 1: Four dimensions of incertitude 
 
Source: Andy Stirling, reproduced from Leach et al. (2010: 53) 
                                                          
2 Press conference, 2002: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiPe1OiKQuk  
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Too often, as Stirling (2003; 2008a; 2010; 2019) argues, power and politics close down towards a risk 
framing. As we navigate our way to choices and decisions, institutionally embedded procedures, 
protocols, methods and techniques influence practices and what is considered taken-for-granted 
knowledge. Social and political orders, alongside socio-technical imaginaries of the future, are co-
constructed with diverse knowledges about the world (Jasanoff 2004; Jasanoff and Kim 2015). 
Disciplinary biases in favour of, say, risk assessment and management and modelling techniques, 
constructing an engineering view of the world, end up pushing and pulling their users towards 
probabilistic solutions: towards a risk framing and away from an embracing of uncertainty. Frequently, 
planning regimes and goal-oriented management systems deny multiple possible outcomes. 
Ambiguities often emerge where there are disputes between different people about possibilities under 
conditions when likelihoods of each can be estimated. A more challenging, and perhaps more common, 
situation is when knowledge about both possible outcomes and their likelihoods is problematic. Under 
such conditions of ignorance, navigating future pathways of change requires a very different approach 
to standard risk management. In other words, power and politics are central to the construction of 
uncertainty as a state of knowledge.  
This simple heuristic suggests that there are multiple dimensions of incertitude and that closing down 
to risk is highly problematic, and potentially dangerous. As Stirling (2019) states: 
Across technology, health, environment and national and global economies, loud voices on all 
sides vie to express messily unknown subjective uncertainties as if these were neatly quantified 
objective risks. However they are seen, the stakes are very high. Huge forces are pressuring for 
a state of uncertainty-denial. What all this means, is that the drive for ostensibly objective 
probabilities is not innocent. Even if inadvertently, it helps shape reassuring policy storylines. 
And, to those interested in ‘business as usual’, the apparent authority and clarity of simple 
numbers can offer a precious sense of stability. 
Many approaches that dominate policy discussions make the same errors. For example, the 
financialisation of risk through techniques of insurance has this effect, as do many ‘disaster risk and 
reduction’ frameworks, as discussed further below. The result is a failure to acknowledge all dimensions 
of incertitude, where a greater appreciation of uncertainty, ambiguity or ignorance is required. This may 
result in constructing a sense of security in what Michael Power (2004; 2007) identifies as a 
contemporary tendency towards ‘the risk management of everything’, when in fact attention to 
unknowns is imperative. The consequences can be devastating when events unfold that individuals and 
institutions are not prepared for – whether a financial or banking crisis or a global disease outbreak, as 
discussed further below. 
To counter a closing down to risk, diverse sources of knowledge are therefore essential for addressing 
all dimensions of incertitude. A technical, modernist perspective, typified by the dominant risk framing, 
relies predominantly (at least in theory) on what Greek thinkers such as Aristotle defined as ‘techne’, a 
formal technical knowledge. Such knowledge in turn may be rooted in systematised theoretical 
understandings, often derived from accredited expert sources, ‘episteme’. This contrasts with 
‘phronesis’, seen as ‘practical wisdom’, rooted in context-dependent, experiential knowledge, linked to 
values and practices, and ‘metis’, a more craft-based practical common sense (Scott 1998).  
Combining approaches, escaping the straitjacket of modernist expertise, is seen to generate a 
necessary, more ‘subtle intelligence’ for addressing uncertainty (Nowotny 2015: 137). This in turn 
requires a radical reappraisal of method in the social sciences if the consequences of ‘mess’, and ‘vague, 
diffuse or unspecific, slippery, emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct’ worlds are to be understood 
(Law 2004: 2), requiring triangulation and deliberation among contrasting viewpoints.   
Many philosophical traditions of knowledge-making exist, even within Western cultures. For example, 
reflective, pragmatist perspectives – from John Dewey (1910) and others – or those who emphasise 
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engaged ‘communicative rationality’, such as Jürgen Habermas (1984), or world-making (Goodman 
1978). Each argues for a different stance. Alternative, cultural-religious belief systems from other parts 
of the world provide an even greater richness and plurality of perspectives on uncertainty, whether 
from different strands of Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism or Islam (Taylor 2007; Batchelor 2015). Wider 
concerns with emotion, affective practices and spiritual belief, in turn, offer insights on the debate about 
uncertainty, and the importance of doubt, impermanence and belief.  
Drawing on different styles of knowledge construction also allows new perspectives to arise, whereby 
uncertainty can be recast as a resource for the future, and a locus for action and possibility. For example, 
in The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt (1958) argues for bringing the future into the present, with 
islands of uncertainty creating the possibilities for action. This is a theme echoed by the contemporary 
writings of Rebecca Solnit (2016; 2017), who envisages creating ‘hope in the dark’, often through the 
process of ‘getting lost’. In a similar vein, by grappling with the future ‘as cultural fact’, Arjun Appadurai 
(2013: 3) argues that building a picture of the historical present ‘can help us find the right balance 
between utopia and despair’. A hopeful, creative and positive construction of uncertainty – as 
opportunity and a resource for action – is suggested, countering the negative connotations of risk and 
uncertainty as challenge or danger.  
2.3.  Emerging Questions 
Some important questions therefore arise around how we understand and frame uncertainties and how 
these are presented in the world (Zaloom 2004). These highlight, most fundamentally, the contrast 
between epistemological and ontological uncertainty and between subjective and objective 
understandings (Walker et al. 2003; Stirling 2019). These debates raise questions around how we deal 
with ignorance (Smithson 1989; Gross 2007, 2010; Rayner 2012), non-knowledge or negative knowledge 
(Knorr-Cetina 1999) in challenging policy settings.  
Such reflections raise issues around the politics and governance of uncertainty, and pose questions 
about how we define modernity and progress. In particular, we must ask: is the linear vision of progress, 
linked to a dominant, technocratic, controlling order, challenged by a deeper recognition of 
uncertainty? And, in turn, what frames become appropriate in seeking alternatives? What alternative 
cultures, practices, institutions and politics are suggested, embedded in different (including non-
Western) histories and traditions? What more can we learn from alternative cultures of uncertainty that 
construct the world in different ways, through different histories, social imaginaries, traditions of 
thinking and everyday practices? How does uncertainty play out through the repertoires of individuals, 
institutions and wider networks, and what tensions and dissonances arise across different spaces of 
incertitude?  
These are of course huge questions, and one short review essay cannot broach them in their entirety. 
The aim here is more to suggest an approach for further enquiry, bringing together diverse perspectives 
and to encourage an onward conversation, rather than offer anything resembling a synthesis. What I 
hope comes over, however, is a sense that asking ‘what is uncertainty?’ is as useful as it is urgent. The 
turbulent times we live in clearly require new thinking on practice, policy and governance. 
3. Five Ways of Thinking about Uncertainty 
The literature on risk and uncertainty is massive, and there is no attempt to be comprehensive in what 
follows. Here I use the term ‘uncertainty’ to illustrate a range of conditions, including ignorance and 
ambiguity that are distinct from ‘risk’. However, it is the literature on ‘risk’, broadly understood, from 
which much of this discussion emerges.  
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Rising anxiety among particularly Western publics and policymakers about the threats from 
environmental pollution or the consequences of new technologies (such as nuclear power) has been 
matched by growing interest in ‘risk analysis’, particularly from the 1970s (Burgess 2016). This has 
accelerated in recent times, as pressing concerns have all been framed by considerations of risk and 
uncertainty (Ansell et al. 2016) – such as climate change and natural disasters (Alfieri et al. 2015; Aven 
and Renn 2015); crime, conflict and terrorism (Anderson 2006; Aradau and Munster 2007; Amoore and 
De Goede 2008); and volatility in financial markets (Battiston et al. 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2015).  
In 1969, Chauncey Starr was among the first to advocate for a technical risk analysis approach (Starr 
1969). This evolved into a number of traditions, associated with different regulatory systems, notably 
the emergence of risk assessment, management and communication in the USA (Millstone 2007). These 
drew on actuarial approaches linking to individualised harm from specific hazards to more systemic, 
collective impacts of interconnected, global risks (Royal Society 1992). A variety of ‘risk governance’ 
approaches also emerged (Krimsky and Golding 1992; National Research Council 1996; Renn et al. 2011; 
Renn 2017). Yet, as Knight (1921) established nearly a century ago, risk is not the same as uncertainty. 
Indeed, more than 30 years ago, Mary Douglas observed, ‘Every choice we make is beset by uncertainty. 
That is the condition of human knowledge. A great deal of risk analysis is concerned with trying to turn 
uncertainties into probabilities’ (1986a: 42). 
In the following sub-sections, I outline five overlapping ways in which this debate in science and policy 
has been interpreted and challenged. These are societal, political, cultural, practice-based and 
individualist perspectives on risk and uncertainty. Each has a huge literature associated with them, and, 
despite the long reference list, I am only highly selective in what follows. Each area of literature, I argue, 
offers some important insights that can be drawn upon in illustrating, ‘what is uncertainty, and why 
does it matter?’  
3.1. Societal Perspectives 
With the publication in Germany of The Risk Society in 1986, Ulrich Beck (1992) provoked a major debate 
on the implications of uncertainty on society and politics. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster, he argued that pervasive risks, emerging as a consequence of modernity, were restructuring 
how politics were being conducted. Risk as a resource was becoming vital for capitalist expansion, he 
argued. A ‘risk society’ challenged conventional notions of expertise, and so required a rethinking of 
institutions, as well as policies towards precaution and sustainability (Beck 1992; Lash et al. 1996; Lash 
2000; Bulkeley 2001; Mythen 2018). In the risk society, risks emerge as the unintended consequences 
of modernity, which conventional institutions of industrial society cannot address. A political focus on 
the distribution of risks (as ‘bads’) means that class becomes a less salient analytical category. Instead, 
through a process of public reflection, a new ‘sub-politics’ emerges as part of what Beck terms ‘reflexive 
modernisation’. 
The Risk Society, and the multiple sequels, including arguments for a ‘world risk society’ (Beck 2009), 
‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck et al. 1994) and a ‘cosmopolitan society’ (Beck 1996; 2002; Beck et al. 
2013; Beck and Levy 2013; Levy, 2018), continue to provoke much discussion in academic and policy 
circles, especially in Europe (Mythen 2004, 2005; Mythen et al. 2018). Many questions have been raised. 
Was this a narrow interpretation based on a northern European experience? What about other cultural, 
historical and socioeconomic contexts (Adam et al. 2000; Caplan 2000; Leach et al. 2002)? Was the 
emergence of a ‘risk society’ the consequence of a particular set of events, cultures and institutional 
experiences, or could this moment be more generalised as a distinct period of world history?  
It may be that our current, turbulent times require such a fundamental rethinking of society. As Bauman 
(2013) argues, we exist in ‘liquid times’, where the certainties of previous frameworks no longer apply. 
‘Nomadism’, he claims, is a trait of ‘liquid modern humans’, and is characterised by flows between 
occupations, identities and networks. Life is shifting, mobile, provisional and improvised, rather than 
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structured, sedentary, fixed and static. The birth of a ‘network society’ (Castells 1996) is accelerated by 
globalised economies, migration and technological connectivity (Wajcman and Dodd 2016), with diverse 
relationships connected ‘rhizomatically’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980).  
However, just as with debates about ‘risk society’, such reflections on ‘modern’ (read ‘Western’) society 
have important precedents elsewhere. The features of Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ replicate many 
characteristics of pastoral societies, which have, by necessity, always lived with and from uncertainty 
(Scoones 1994; Krätli and Schareika 2010). Variability is a resource on which pastoralism must thrive, 
and confronting uncertainty is therefore a way of life, not a problem to be overcome (Krätli et al. 2015). 
In terms of wider social science debates on risk and uncertainty, competing conceptual framings have 
been discussed. By way of example, in explaining the rise of debates about risk, is a ‘risk society’ or a 
‘governmentality’ framing more appropriate (Mythen and Waklate 2005)? Is there really such a rupture 
from classic class dynamics and the functioning of capitalism as suggested by The Risk Society’s sweeping 
generalisations (Stanley 2013; Curran 2013, 2106, 2018)? Even if ‘manufactured’ risks are important 
(Michaels 2006), surely the natural world remains important? Risk (and uncertainty) may be important 
in restructuring society, but perhaps in a less universalising manner than is sometimes argued (Lupton 
1997; Tulloch and Lupton 2003; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006a).  
A constructivist perspective on risk, central to a long tradition in science and technology studies, offers 
a more nuanced perspective, but also with significant societal implications. As Sheila Jasanoff argues 
(1993; 1999), a point echoed by Brian Wynne (1992a), risks are ‘constructed’ and are ‘manufactured’ 
through particular styles of politics and via institutional interventions. This is not to say that hazards are 
not real, but understandings and responses are inevitably and variably mediated. This is a theme 
emphasised by Niklas Luhmann (1993, 1997), another influential German sociologist, who argues that 
the notion of risk emerges in modernity to replace ‘danger’ and predetermined future outcomes.  
Science and technology studies critiques emphasise in turn that a technocratic reading of risk, as one 
that involves a gap of understanding between science and publics, is problematic (Wynne 1992b; Rayner 
2012). Social and cultural reflections emphasise the need to move beyond individual choice 
perspectives, often central to reflexive modernisation, to thinking about how collective, cultural and 
institutional dimensions affect how societies respond to risk and uncertainty (Caplan 2000; Nugent 
2000).   
What is undisputed is a recognition of the wider penetration and assimilation of risk thinking and 
practice in society. The rise of an ‘audit culture’, and a plethora of forms of accounting and assessment, 
act to obscure complexity and hide deeper uncertainties, for example (Power 2007). As Louise Amoore 
argues, an entire range of commercial operations – from risk management consultancies to data analysis 
firms to logistics companies – has become involved in the functioning of state security, deriving from a 
political focus on the possibilities of low likelihood, high consequence events, spanning terrorism to 
financial collapse and other human-induced disasters. A technocratic, control-oriented style of 
governance is reinforced by the role of specialisms in expertise that defines the future. Technical-
managerial responses, such as insurance and liability law, are favoured over more deliberative 
governance approaches and inclusive governance principles such as precaution (Voss et al. 2006; Stirling 
2008b; Renn et al. 2011; Renn 2017).  
Debates about society in the Anthropocene, with human–nature relations recognised as inextricably 
entwined, reflect these tensions. Some argue that the Anthropocene excuses a style of ‘cockpit’, 
control-oriented, global governance in the name of protecting the environment from human 
depredations (Biermann 2014; Hajer et al. 2015); while for others an acceptance of the influence of 
uncertain, uncontrollable nature offers opportunities for a greater humility and enhanced human–
society relations (Palsson et al. 2013; Lövbrand et al. 2015; Swyngedouw 2015). What is for sure is that 
rapidly changing environmental and economic conditions mean that debates about responsibility and 
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accountability are brought into sharp relief (Giddens 1999). Such discussions in turn suggest new forms 
of citizen-state-society relations, requiring new styles of governance in the face of uncertain futures. 
3.2. Political Perspectives  
Just as debates around risk and uncertainty are seen to construct society, they also generate styles of 
politics. In his polemic on the value of market liberalism, Bernstein (1998) famously argued in Against 
the Gods that uncertainty ‘makes us free’, liberating entrepreneurs from the shackles of state control. 
Others frame the political challenge around ‘calculated futures’, where the technocracy offers planned 
guidance and response in the face of uncertainty, creating an array of political technologies and forms 
of governmentality, where governmentality is understood as the ‘conduct of conduct’ – the way that 
techniques of government are deployed to produce governable subjects (Burchell et al. 1991; Dean 
2010). Framing risk thus means framing politics, and what emerges are different forms of biopolitics, 
understood – following Michel Foucault (2007; 2008) – as the interaction of sovereignty, discipline and 
governmental management, which together have ‘population as its main target and apparatuses of 
security as its essential mechanism’ (quoted in Amoore 2013: 65).  
Discussing the history of insurance, François Ewald (1991) showed long ago how risk is co-constructed 
with politics, from collaborative mutual societies to individualised actuarial logics, through the 
governmental techniques of indemnities, indices and liabilities. Such political technologies create 
subjects (the insured population) and objects (the hazards) and discipline responses to risk in particular 
ways, generating moral orders, obligations and responsibilities (cf. O’Malley 1996, 2003). These 
responses are, however, not set or given, but are negotiated in different political systems. Governing 
emerges through such forms of biopolitical disciplining, as well as through the exercise of sovereignty, 
via the legal system and the state, and through market regulation (Dillon 2007; Samimian-Darash and 
Rabinow 2015).  
In relation to contemporary environmental questions, processes of marketisation (Çalışkan and Callon 
2010) – involving governing at a distance via market mechanisms – create new political relationships 
around the risks and uncertainties of, say, climate change, air pollution or environmental degradation. 
In this context, ‘contingency’ becomes an important discourse (Dillon 2007; Oels 2013), making the 
ungovernable governable (Ziederman 2012; Ziederman et al. 2015).  
When conditions are uncertain, approaches to ‘governance’ – how power, authority and influence are 
deployed to affect public policies and decisions – must also change. For many this requires far more 
caution and much more rethinking when it comes to relying on linear, technocratic approaches, 
embedded in political-bureaucratic systems. Flexible, adaptive governance has been proposed, resulting 
in a large literature, for example, on experimental approaches (e.g. Greenberg et al. 2003; Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2010; Overdevest et al. 2010; De Búrca et al. 2014; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014; Laakso et al. 
2017; Kronsell and Mukhtar-Landgren 2018; Voss and Simons 2018; Rangoni 2019). 
How risks and uncertainties, and their material effects, are experienced are fundamentally affected by 
who people are, and how justice and freedom are understood (Douglas 1986a). While Beck argued that 
class, and so wealth and asset ownership, should no longer be the focus for political economy, but 
instead ‘risk positions’ in relation to emerging modern risks, many have argued that such a perspective 
is unjustified (Zinn 2009; Curran 2013, 2018; O’Malley 2016). Indeed, class – and gender, age, race, 
education – become vital lenses through which to understand perceptions of and responses to risk and 
uncertainty (Braun 2003; Braun and McCarthy 2005; Gertel and Hexel 2018).  
It has long been recognised that vulnerability must be understood not just in terms of hazard, but also 
the underlying social dynamics, asking who is vulnerable to what, and how are responses circumscribed 
by social-economic position and historical political economy (Blaikie et al. 2004; Adger 2006; Watts 
2015). In the same way and discussed further below, risk and uncertainty must be explored in relation 
 14 
 
to a wider political economy and ecology analysis, where social difference and the intersections with 
power and forms of governmentality are central to any analysis. 
3.3. Cultural Perspectives 
Of course, cultural perspectives on risk and uncertainty are deeply entwined with the sociological and 
political perspectives discussed above. Social anthropologists, nevertheless, have pushed our 
understandings in ways that encompass a wider range of non-Western societies, arguing for ideas of 
multiple modernities, forged in very different settings. That cultures are not the same, and are always 
changing, is stating the obvious; but how do cultural norms, practices and expressions shape the way 
that uncertainties are embraced?  
In Risk and Culture, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1983) argue that a liberal, ‘sectarian’ worldview 
in Western nations emerged during the 1970s to highlight consumer and environmental risks. In 
‘cultural theory’ and the discussions that have emerged (cf. Thompson et al. 1990; Douglas 1999), 
different archetypes are identified and demonstrated across a grid-group schema – individualist, fatalist, 
hierarchist and egalitarian – each said to define a culturally embedded form of behaviour in relation to 
risk.  
Many have argued that simple grid-group categories fail to recognise the textured, context-specific 
nature of ‘culture’, as located in everyday practices (Tulloch and Lupton 2003). Drawing on the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu, the notion of ‘habitus’ is used to explain engrained predispositions towards styles of 
risk-taking (Hanappi 2011). Practical experiences based on long-held understandings of environments 
demonstrate how local – often tacit and experiential – knowledges are crucial for responding to 
uncertainties, as in Brian Wynne’s classic discussion of how Cumbrian sheep farmers in the UK reacted 
to the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl (Wynne 1992b; 1996). He argues:  
Much of [the] conflict between expert and lay epistemologies centred on the clash between 
the taken for granted scientific culture of prediction and control, and the farmers’ culture in 
which lack of control was taken for granted… The farmers assumed predictability to be 
intrinsically unreliable as an assumption and therefore valued adaptability and flexibility, as a 
key part of their cultural identity and practical knowledge.  
(1996: 67)  
Understandings of and responses to uncertainty are thus inevitably wrapped up in people’s intimate 
realities, historical memories, personal experiences and social identities.   
Views of uncertain futures are also conditioned by wider belief systems (Da Col and Humphrey 2012; 
Da Col 2012). Religious and cultural notions of impermanence and transience, fate and destiny, 
divination and magic, all affect how risks and uncertainties are perceived and responded to. Astrologers, 
soothsayers, oracles, prophets, priests and their modern-day equivalents thus remain important 
purveyors and interpreters of arcane, specialist knowledge about the future (Geschiere 1997). Cultural 
understandings of pollution and purity can be linked to perceptions of danger as boundaries are 
transgressed (Douglas 1992, 1966), and can be culturally constructed as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ risks (Nugent 
2000).  
Rituals in this perspective can best be seen as part of performative storytelling of socially agreed 
narratives, central to collective ways of dealing with an uncertain world (Moore and Sanders 2003; 
Graeber 2012). David Graeber (2012), for example, reflects on Malagasy notions of destiny and notes 
the similarities with the cultural performance in finance markets. The occult, witchcraft and rumour are 
quintessentially modern, it is argued, not a reflection of backward fatalism, but a pragmatic, cultural 
response to uncertainty, shaped by media-scapes and global imaginaries (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993, 
1999; Appadurai 1996). In increasingly anonymous urban contexts and with easier access to 
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communication, some contend that the possibilities of rumour and ‘fake news’ spreading are high, 
making accusations of witchcraft and the rise of the occult potentially more prevalent (Bonhomme 
2012; Berthome et al. 2012). 
Forms of sociality involving trusting relationships and of ongoing, repeated meetings and conversations 
– often linked to rumour and gossip – are seen as important in providing the generative conditions for 
responding to uncertainty (Newhouse 2017). Connected to a wider, social ‘moral economy’, the 
collective, networked response can be crucial. This may emerge from the mundane practices of 
interactions, be they in social gatherings, churches, drinking places or among extended families 
(Newhouse 2017). Complex forms of convivial sociality (like the earlier versions of ‘sociability’) construct 
the basis on which ‘the economic’, and wider responses to uncertain futures, are formed (cf. Gibson-
Graham 2008; Bear et al. 2015). These forms of sociality, as a route to confronting uncertainty, starkly 
contrast with the individualised, marketised, technically governed contexts in other cultures, where a 
managerial risk culture dominates.   
In what some regard as desperate situations plagued by uncertainties, others can see hope and more 
positive futures. Uncertainty thus creates space for action. Studies of African migrants’ experiences link 
hope with uncertainty (Kleist and Thorsen 2016). The experience of continuous mobility, unclear rights 
and contested citizenship, sometimes in the aftermath of conflict and war, would, for many, be seen as 
a description of deep disenfranchisement. While anxieties and trauma arise from such uncertainties, 
there can also be positive hope – an escape, a liberation, a sense of freedom from danger or oppression. 
From such a standpoint, possibilities open up. The ‘spectacular conjuring acts’ of ‘economies of 
appearances’ are thus ways of making things happen, creating possibilities seemingly from nowhere (cf. 
Tsing 2000, 2011). Reflecting on African ethnographic cases, Elizabeth Cooper and David Pratten (2014: 
1) see ‘uncertainty as a structure of feeling – the lived experience of vulnerability, anxiety, hope and 
possibility, mediated through the material assemblages that underpin, saturate and sustain everyday 
life’.  
Living for the moment, appropriating the future for the present, and making do in difficult circumstances 
are all ways of creating opportunities from uncertainty (Pedersen 2012). Different cultural constructions 
of time are also routes to address doubt and uncertainty, changing the relationship between now and 
the future, in ways that doubtlessly differ between places, genders and generations (Johnson-Hanks 
2002; Guyer 2007; Nielsen 2014; Bear 2016). Cultural ideas of time affect how we view the future, and 
the ability to predict, anticipate and control outcomes. A radical departure from any Enlightenment view 
of time as linear, ordered and uni-dimensional means accepting collapsed, multi-layered time in 
conditions where change is accelerating. As Barbara Adam (1990, 1996) argues, this means seeing 
‘multiple processes simultaneously, embrac[ing] contradictions and paradoxes, the unknowable and 
unknown’ (1996: 110). This requires engaging morally with the future: ‘A simultaneous recognition of 
the intrinsic indeterminacy of the future, and our roles in shaping that future, impose on us all the duty 
to take responsibility for the future that we are creating’ (Adam 1996: 100).  
This in turn may open up hopeful opportunities for action. As Rebecca Solnit (2016: xii) so memorably 
argued in Hope in the Dark:  
Hope locates itself in the premises that we don’t know what will happen and that in the 
spaciousness of uncertainty is room to act. When you recognize uncertainty, you recognize that 
you may be able to influence the outcomes – you alone or you in concert with a few dozen or 
several million others. Hope is an embrace of the unknown and knowable, an alternative to the 
certainty of both optimists and pessimists.  
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3.4. Practice Perspectives 
Practices are central to the enactment of social, political and cultural responses to uncertainty (cf. 
Ortner 1984, 2005; Stengers 2005), seen often as part of a ‘performance’ (Butler 1997). The calculative 
practices of prediction and modelling, from this perspective, are central to the construction of many 
risk-oriented responses (cf. Knorr-Cetina and Preda 2006; Callon et al. 2007; MacKenzie et al. 2007; 
MacKenzie 2008, 2009; Callon, 2009). The risk heat maps, emergency preparedness plans and business 
contingency measures are all practices central to creating forms of ‘biopolitical’ governmentality 
associated with risk, threat and emergency (Collier et al. 2004; Lentzos and Rose 2009; Collier and Lakoff 
2015). These contrast with alternative practices responding to uncertainty that create ‘spaces of 
possibility’. In the context of urban development, such practices might include site visits, conversations 
among officials and affected people, and deliberation among diverse forms of expertise (Ziederman 
2015).  
The iterative, responsive, adaptive, practical modes of public administrators who must ‘muddle through’ 
(Lindblom 1959, 1966), or more actively improvise, invent and chart out possible options (Hirschman 
1970, 1971), represent practices central to the everyday experience of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 
2010), among others navigating complexity and uncertainty each day. A contrast between root-style 
decision-making, which is rationalist and theoretical, with branch-style decision-making, which is 
strategic, pragmatic and incremental, thus emerges (Lindblom 1959, 1979) Rarely appreciated in the 
dominant frame of linear planning and top-down execution, such practices allow systems to change and 
development to happen, it is argued (Hirschman 1971). In times of crisis, but with no guarantees, things 
often ‘don’t fall apart’ precisely because a range of unsung people hold things together (Grabel 2010, 
2018).  
In managing mess and generating reliability, and so avoiding potentially catastrophic accidents or 
systems failures, the practices of reliability professionals (Schulman et al. 2004; Roe and Schulman 2008; 
Roe 2013, 2016) and organisations (La Porte 1996) have been highlighted. Operating in the ‘control 
rooms’ of critical infrastructure facilities – energy supply companies, air traffic control towers and so on 
– ‘reliability professionals’ are vital.  
Acting in a different way to the ground-level operators, field-based administrators and ‘street-level’ 
bureaucrats, they have important skills in ‘recognizing system-wide patterns, formulating locally specific 
contingency scenarios and translating both patterns and scenarios in highly reliable services’ (Roe 2016: 
351). By operating across performance modes, they are able to manage (not attempt to clean up) policy 
messes and so assure reliability (Roe 2013, 2016; Roe and Schulman 2018). Again, such professionals 
are rarely acknowledged or appreciated. They do not have a formal job description, but their learned 
practices – working in loose networks with others – are essential to system operation, making sure key 
services are delivered, despite highly volatile, uncertain contexts. While the identification of reliability 
professionals has been most elaborated in the context of critical infrastructure operations, such 
practices – and the people and networks associated – are essential in any system where a reliable supply 
of outputs is required in complex, challenging, uncertain settings.  
Whether these are pastoralists in African rangelands (Roe et al. 1998), farmers in West Africa (Richards 
2018), humanitarian workers in conflict settings, healthcare workers (Khan et al. 2018), or those 
responding to disease outbreak emergencies in global health systems (Samimian-Darash et al. 2012; 
Lakoff 2017), similar principles apply. Thus, for example, farmers responding to the vagaries of the 
weather or the uncertainties created by external ‘development projects’ must generate improvised 
performances that help to respond to field conditions, as well as navigate a wider political economy 
(Flachs and Richards 2018). Managing mess (the complexity and uncertainty of the real world) requires 
the ability to track between wider context and micro-operation. Learning from cases, being alert to the 
unusual, networking with others and experimenting and innovating when a crisis is not in full swing, are 
all key features (Roe and Schulman 2008).  
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Organisational theorists have made similar points in relation to the use of tacit knowledge, craft 
practices, experimentation, mindfulness and shared sense-making as important in responding to 
complexity and uncertainty (March and Olsen 1975; Weick 1995; Weick and Sutcliffe 2011; Petterson 
and Schulman 2016). Ray Ison (2018) advocates a praxis perspective, where reflexive systemic 
sensibilities are central to addressing complexity and uncertainty in processes of transformation. All are, 
it is argued, essential features of successful organisations that must navigate the unknown.  
A focus on practice directs attention to agency: how people choose to act in the world where knowledge 
and action are inseparable (Shove et al. 2012; Arora 2017; Arora and Glover 2017). Confronting 
uncertainties from ‘nature’ equally means going beyond a framing that sees external, biophysical 
hazards as independently generating risks and vulnerabilities. There are mutually co-constructed 
agencies at play. Nature and human action are intimately bound together, with human agents not 
simply working in isolation. Thus, interactions between human and non-human natures, bound up in 
extended actor networks, must necessarily become central to our understandings of how uncertainties 
are lived with (Law 1999; Latour 2005). In this view, multiple agencies and diverse practices link human–
nature networks in ways that both generate and confront uncertainties as horizons of possibilities.  
3.5. Individual Perspectives 
Studies of risk have a long tradition of examining individualised risk perceptions – what some term the 
‘psychometric paradigm’ (cf. Slovic et al. 1980; Fischoff et al. 1983; Slovic 1987). Tests aimed at eliciting 
individuals’ perceptions are administered, and different categories of response – dread, safety first, 
blame – are surfaced or derived. Risk communication (Plough and Krimsky 1987), often based on the 
‘deficit model’ (cf. Wynne 1992b), and discussions of the ‘social amplification of risk’ are frequently 
rooted in such individualist understandings (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996; Pidgeon et al. 2003). The 
individualist focus of much (Western) psychology is similarly reflected in such approaches (Ji et al. 2001; 
Loewenstein et al. 2001; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006b; Penrod 2007), which unsurprisingly result in an 
emphasis on individualised risk responses through personal resilience, perseverance, tolerance, 
anticipation and so on (Bammer and Smithson 2008; Burgess 2018). 
Recent developments in neurobiology and the understanding of brain function have similarly 
emphasised an individual, biological response to uncertainty. Studies have demonstrated neural 
representations of uncertainty (Hsu et al. 2005; Grinband et al. 2006), neurobiological responses to 
ambiguity (Bach et al. 2011; Bach and Dolan 2012), learning in the face of uncertainty (Knill and Pouget 
2004; Hasson 2017), emotional responses to uncertainty (Tiedens et al. 2001) and anxiety about future 
risks and uncertainty (Grupe and Nitschke 2013). 
Decision theorists again focus on individualised responses, very often based on gambling decisions 
(Heath and Tversky 1991; Fox and Tversky 1995) or game theory calculus (von Neuman and Morgenstein 
1944). A focus on individual decisions evokes the importance of individualised mental heuristics in 
making choices (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1982). Such approaches, 
however, contrast with arguments for more intuitive responses to wider uncertainties, such as ‘rules of 
thumb’ (Heiner 1983), bounded rationality (Simon 1962, 1997), emotional responses (Tuckett 2011, 
2018) and fictional expectation (Beckert 2013) – all linked to cultural influences on choice and 
perception (Otway and Thomas 1982). More complex, culturally embedded approaches to decision-
making are revealed, rather than a straightforward contrast between risk-taking and risk-averse 
behaviours. Farmers, for instance, may follow a series of decisions in sequence (Ortiz 1967), initially 
opting for ‘safety-first’ solutions to secure basic food before taking more risks (Kunreuther and Wright 
1974).  
The focus on individual behaviour comes into tension with more social constructivist perspectives on 
behaviour. These argue that, while individual perspectives and actions are important, these need always 
to be seen as emerging from interactions with other people, institutions and wider society. Moral 
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attitudes to risk depend on socio-cultural experiences, which may differ quite radically within one 
community (Thompson 1984). Risk and values are inevitably co-constructed (Jasanoff 1999), making it 
crucial to reflect on how individual behaviour is conditioned by wider morality and values. Additionally, 
different people have contrasting mental agility, senses of preparedness and emotional resources to 
respond to uncertainties. Here a focus on the emotional and affective becomes important, embedded 
in wider social and cultural norms (Anderson 2006). These resources may be quite different across 
geographical location, class, gender, age and education, as people’s abilities, experiences and capacities 
for living with uncertainties vary.  
The sort of cultural metaphors, tropes and stories marshalled in thinking about uncertainty also differ 
across locations (Lackoff and Johnson 2008; Akerlof and Schiller 2010), and with significant effect. The 
use of metaphors, tropes and stories affect individuals’ predispositions and ability to cope and respond. 
Similarly, narrative frames – storylines about the world – provide the basis for navigating uncertain 
change by individuals and groups; these may help to open up opportunities for positive change, or they 
may close down and shift towards despair and disaster (Beckert and Bronk 2018; Tuckett 2018).  
Experiences matter. In the past, perspectives on living with, on or from uncertainty have been quite 
different among pastoralists used to moving and responding to changing environmental and market 
conditions, compared to people living in a settled, urban setting, where provision of services was 
expected to be predictable and controlled. This may be changing, as the mobilities and precarities of 
contemporary urban life for many may have rendered experiences more similar. Thus, responding to 
uncertainty in terms of impending disaster or as opportunity and hope, depends very much on individual 
perspectives, as shaped by social-cultural contexts. 
****** 
As this brief, and necessarily selective, review of different literatures has shown, there are diverse ways 
of thinking about uncertainty, each framing problems and solutions in different ways. By this point it 
should be clear that the categories of social, political, cultural, practice-based and individual are not 
mutually exclusive, and perspectives necessarily intertwine. How then do these perspectives inform 
responses to uncertainty in different domains? Here again the focus must be illustrative rather than 
comprehensive. 
4. Responding to Uncertainty in Different Domains 
In this section, I discuss four cases – finance and banking, critical infrastructures, disease outbreaks, and 
climate and natural disasters – aiming to probe how uncertainty is thought about and responded to, 
linking back to the areas of literature discussed above. In each case, there are traditions of management 
and control that can be contrasted with those that are more open, flexible and experimental. By 
presenting very diverse examples from such different domains alongside each other, the aim is also to 
highlight some similar lessons and principles for responding to uncertainties.  
4.1. Finance and Banking: Volatility in Market Networks 
The financial crash of 2007–8 in banking and finance systems has generated much reflection on what 
went wrong. How could such contagion spread across the system, resulting in near catastrophic 
collapse? Surely, the international regulatory systems were designed to prevent such outcomes? Surely, 
the sophisticated algorithms and models that assessed risk in the system were designed for such a task?  
The answers emerging are sobering. The sophisticated market in complex derivatives, spread across a 
huge number of actors, with limited interaction beyond electronic exchange, and based on voluntary 
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regulation by major banking finance houses proved immensely unstable (Arinaminpathy et al. 2012; 
Haldane 2012; Battiston et al. 2013). Stefano Battiston et al. (2016: 10031), for example, show how 
‘small errors on the knowledge of the network of contracts can lead to large errors in the probability of 
systemic defaults’; a consequence of the collective dynamics of ‘small world’ networks (Watts and 
Strogatz 1998). As mathematical ecology showed decades ago, complexity does not necessarily beget 
stability (May 1974) – and so it was in banking systems (May et al. 2008; May and Arinaminpathy 2010; 
Haldane 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2012; Haldane and May 2011; Gai et al. 2011; Battiston and Caldarelli 
2013; Garnier et al. 2013; Elliot et al. 2014). Just as in the containment of forest fires, insect pest 
outbreaks or infectious diseases, there are a number of features that increase network robustness (May 
et al. 2008) and help to avoid systemic risks (Kambhu et al. 2007; Beale et al. 2011). These include: 
modularity redundancy in design (such as using firebreaks and movement restrictions), close feedback 
loops (encouraging communication within networks) and identifying super-spreaders (spotting the 
nodes that spread contagion the fastest).  
In the pre-crash banking system, it was the very complexity of the algorithms and the associated models, 
co-constructed with the organisation of the banking system, that caused some of the problems, even if 
practitioners were perfectly aware of the models’ limitations (Millo and MacKenzie 2009; Wansleben 
2012; MacKenzie and Spears 2014). Running on high-speed computers and servers, resulting in 
exchanges taking place globally in nano-seconds, meant that no one knew exactly what was going on in 
real time. Volatility in one part of the network could spread very fast to other parts, as ‘evaluation 
cultures’ were unable to cope (MacKenzie and Spears 2014). As Andy Haldane (2009a: 7), Chief 
Economist at the Bank of England, put it:   
Securitisation increased the dimensionality, and thus complexity, of the financial network. 
Nodes grew in size and interconnections between them multiplied. The financial cat’s-cradle 
became dense and opaque. As a result, the precise source and location of underlying claims 
became anyone’s guess. Follow-the-leader became blind-man’s buff. In short, diversification 
strategies by individual firms generated heightened uncertainty across the system as a whole.   
Thus, increasing complexity and decreasing diversity meant that the financial network became more 
fragile. Points in a network can act as absorbers or amplifiers of shocks, depending on the configuration. 
In the case of the contagion that spread during the financial crisis, certain nodes became major 
amplifiers. This was also added to, as risk was profitable: ‘escalating leverage, increased trading 
portfolios and the design of tail-heavy financial instruments’ were all key elements (Haldane 2010: 9). 
The financial crisis, Haldane (2010: 12) argues, was rooted in ‘an exaggerated sense of knowledge and 
control’. He notes, ‘Risks and counterparty relationships outstripped banks’ ability to manage them. 
Servers outpaced synapses. Large banks grew to comprise several thousand distinct legal entities. When 
Lehman Brothers failed, it had almost one million open derivatives.’ 
The implications for regulation are profound. The Basel framework for financial regulation, based on a 
complex, layered web of risk-based measures was found seriously wanting. Haldane (2012: 19) 
observes, ‘because complexity generates uncertainty, not risk, it requires a regulatory response 
grounded in simplicity, not complexity’. This, he argues, means rethinking network configurations, and 
facilitating new practices and behaviours among those involved, requiring new skills to enhance 
reliability. This suggests a shift from reliance on opaque and highly complex risk-based models to 
allowing supervisors more discretion and judgement, accepting uncertainty as a subjectively 
constructed state of knowledge. This requires deliberation among response options in the face of 
inevitably incomplete information, and encouragement of a bigger picture view, rather than a narrow 
obsession with tick-box rule compliance. By breaking up the network into more modular units, human 
relationships and interactions can be encouraged and sustained and wider crises spotted.  
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Ethnographic studies of banks, trading floors and financial analysts have shown how, despite the 
systemic failures of network organisation and regulation, key actors responded (Wansleben 2012, 2014; 
Leins 2018). After all, the crisis did not result in a wholesale collapse (Grabel 2018). Networks among 
actors are vital, as is the performative dimension in the way that models, practices and responses are 
constructed (Callon 2009; MacKenzie 2008, 2009). Here, rules-of-thumb, practical heuristics, 
imagination and experimentation were all key (Akerlof and Shiller 2010; Tuckett 2018).  
The practical, adaptive responses of financial regulators, supervisors and traders are seen in hindsight 
to be essential factors in avoiding even more damage (Grabel 2018). This means the encouragement of 
‘productive incoherence’ and pragmatic innovation in financial systems (Grabel 2010), along with a 
challenge of analytical monocultures, entrenched mental models and group-based emotions and 
behaviours (Bronk and Jacoby 2016).  
The experience of the financial crisis suggests some major challenges to thinking and practice in 
economics and finance, however. Since the 1950s, mainstream economic frameworks have all assumed 
that future risks are known, or predictable. For example, finance economists argued that risk could be 
calculated and securitised and that portfolio risks could be measured, priced and hedged (Rubinstein 
1974; Merton 1969). Economic actors, in turn, showed rational expectations in contexts of complete 
knowledge, and economies functioned according to models of general equilibrium (Haldane 2012). But 
these are strong assumptions, embedded in elegant models and linked to politically expedient policy 
recommendations. However, as discussed earlier, older traditions of macroeconomics – ‘from Keynes 
to Hayek and from Simon to Friedman’ – have long questioned such assumptions. In such perspectives, 
coming from very different political stances, imperfections in information and knowledge, and so an 
emphasis on subjective constructions of uncertainty, are seen to be central (Haldane 2012: 2).  
Lessons from the financial crisis reinforce the idea, following Karl Polanyi (1944) and many others, that 
economies are always embedded, and understanding and responding to uncertainty must reflect this 
(Beckert 1996, 2007; Evans 2009). New perspectives in economic thinking and practice are today 
fundamentally challenging mainstream approaches. These are exploring, for example, network 
topologies and dynamics (Anand et al. 2012), emotion and imagination (Beckert 2015; Tuckett 2011), 
narratives and storytelling (Beckert and Bronk 2016) and co-evolution, adaptive management and 
innovation (Rammel et al. 2007).  
Such approaches all make perspectives on uncertainty central, and all suggest a more grounded, 
interdisciplinary approach to economics and finance, rejecting the reliance on arcane, opaque or overly 
simplified models of risk and control.  
4.2. Critical Infrastructures: Generating Reliability 
In the context of critical infrastructures discussed above, reliability emerges when there is the safe and 
continuous provision of the service. Such services may be, for example, water, electricity, natural gas or 
telecommunications. Each is subject to uncertain stresses and shocks – for instance, volatile demand, 
sudden system failures, and natural hazards affecting the system as a whole. As a result, managers of 
such systems must deal with risk and uncertainty continuously. 
The engineering response is to develop a series of design protocols that ensure services are offered 
without disruption, based on the modelling of event scenarios, predicted as regular or as a once-in-a-
decade occurrence. These systems are centred squarely on risk management and emergency planning. 
Highly trained engineers will be on call to fix problems when they arise, even if some level of redundancy 
is incorporated in the system. This risk analysis and management approach is the standard response 
but, beyond the protocols, procedures and regulations, there are other things going on.  
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Those studying critical infrastructures in practice (not just by design) have observed a set of other 
practices and behaviours. Accidents will always happen; they are ‘normal’, as Charles Perrow 
(1984/2011) argues. He shows how catastrophic accidents are more likely in tightly coupled complex 
systems, where complexity overwhelms adaptive flexibility. Whether in respect of oil platforms, systems 
of aircraft navigation or nuclear power plants, unnecessarily complex control systems can often result 
in failure. Better to have in-built redundancy, flexibility, the ability to adapt and learn than a supposedly 
fool-proof engineered system, which will almost inevitably fail at some point.  
Those studying critical infrastructures argue that reliability is generated through proactive intervention, 
not passive coping. This is undertaken by reliability professionals who are skilled at dealing with ‘mess’ 
(Roe 2013; 2016). As noted above, it is the knowledge, skills and practices of such professionals that are 
crucial in assuring the reliable function of critical infrastructure systems, where failure is not acceptable 
– as in the case of nuclear power plant or air traffic control systems – because they are highly dangerous 
and dreaded.  
How risks and uncertainties are responded to depends on how the system is bounded; in other words, 
what is being operated, both in the ‘control room’ and the wider network, linking, by way of example, 
scientists, engineers, information technology professionals, suppliers, regulators and others, who, 
together, keep the system running. Responses also depend on the standards to which service provision 
is expected to perform. This may differ, say, between precluding certain events, avoiding catastrophic 
collapse, or accepting some inevitable disruption. What reliability is and how it is managed will therefore 
depend on all these factors.  
Reliability management also depends on the level of uncertainty – in the sense of knowledge of 
likelihoods and outcomes. Avoiding conditions of ignorance is crucial, but experimenting, adapting, and 
improvising in ways that do not threaten the limits of system survival when conditions are uncertain or 
ambivalent, reinforces the robustness of response. So, in a control room, reliability (or mess) 
professionals must assess probabilities of likelihoods and outcomes in real time, and help to navigate 
towards reliability. Many of these responses are informal, mostly unnoticed, below-the-radar practices, 
but are crucial to generating reliability (Roe 2013).  
Research on electricity systems in California, as well as on other infrastructures, shows how the use of 
tacit, experiential knowledge, case studies, scenario analysis and pattern-recognition skills, combine 
with astute vigilance and accumulated experience, held in both individuals and networks (Roe and 
Schulman 2008, 2016; Pettersen and Schulman 2016). These practices go beyond the macro-design of 
the policymaker or planner, but also beyond the micro-operations of the ‘street-level bureaucrat’, since, 
as discussed earlier, reliability/mess professionals are required to track between these modes. This 
requires adaptation, customisation, the ability to respond to contingencies and recognising what works 
from case examples and runs of repeat operations (Roe 2016).  
No single individual can undertake all these tasks, so reliability emerges from lateral, mutualistic 
networks; ones (unlike the failed banking finance networks discussed above) that are linked by personal 
contact, trust and collegial relationships, and a common understanding of performance regimes that 
avoid failure and prevent complacency. Not getting lost in the detail of immediate operational concerns, 
nor disappearing into the big-picture policy frame, the reliability professionals must tack between these 
frames, learning continuously and spotting problems and responding in real time.  
4.3. Disease Outbreaks: Preparedness and Early Warning 
When the next major global disease emergency will occur is always uncertain. For this reason, elaborate 
systems of early warning and preparedness have been developed at national and international levels. 
The outbreaks of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), avian influenza, Zika and Ebola reinforced 
the need for such systems. But are such responses always the best way of addressing such events? Even 
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if uncertainty is accepted in planning for future scenarios, are such systems effective? How does the 
construction of an ‘emergency’ change the way that responses are managed?  
Emergencies imply an exceptional event, one where extraordinary measures are required. Rapid 
response involves the speedy mobilisation of people and resources. The framing around an emergency 
means that democratic accountabilities no longer apply for the interim and that a technocratic, 
managerial response must be rolled out at speed for the ‘public good’. Whether in health/disease 
emergencies, or as a result of terrorist attacks or natural disasters, emergency responses have become 
central to the accepted conduct by state agencies (Calhoun 2010).   
Because emergencies are unexpected, responses must operate based on contingency plans often 
developed through scenario or table-top exercises (Samimian-Darash and Rotem 2018). Such scenarios 
are very often developed by experts and professionals working with state agencies, and so are framed 
around scientific-technical interventions. In the case of disease outbreaks, early warning systems 
spotting – say, of heightened mortalities, unexplained market shifts or sudden movements of people – 
are frequently linked to ‘containment’ measures that aim to control the disease ‘at source’ (cf. Scoones 
2010; Leach et al. 2010).  
Particularly following the SARS and avian influenza outbreaks in the 2000s, significant investments in 
early warning and rapid responses were made, including the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network at the World Health Organization (WHO). Responses were linked to a coordinated risk 
assessment graded into different levels of threat. Early action and ‘at source’ intervention are seen as 
imperative to avoid escalation to increasingly stringent measures (McCloskey et al. 2014).  
Very often a globalised threat discourse is at the centre of justification for investment in systems at 
international level (Dry and Leach 2010). The potential cascading costs of a disease outbreak emanating 
from South-east Asia or West Africa, for example, to global trade and rich market economies are used 
to justify often draconian restrictions on movement, culling of animals or vaccinations of animals or 
humans. A securitised, medicalised global health response is the result, sometimes envisaging the 
deployment of the police or the armed services to enforce movement restrictions so as to contain a 
disease (Elbe 2010; Lock and Nguyen 2018).  
Uncertainties about the potential spread and impact of a disease play into this type of response. 
Epidemiological modelling exercises, using assumptions about the probabilities of spread and the 
likelihood of mortality, feed into and fuel policy responses and wider media and public apprehension 
(Leach and Scoones 2013). Taking worst-case scenarios, catastrophic possibilities are envisaged. 
Memories of past outbreaks and exemplars – notably the 1918 influenza epidemic – feed into the 
debate. Urgent, rapid action in the face of deep uncertainty – in fact, ignorance – is thus urged, and 
supported by significant investments of resources (Stirling and Scoones 2009).  
The discourse of preparedness in the face of uncertain events has a long pedigree, not confined to health 
and disease issues. Andrew Lakoff (2007, 2017) traces current approaches in health to Cold War civil 
contingency and defence responses to assumed threats of Soviet invasion or nuclear attack, which have 
since become embedded in institutional responses around other emergencies. Public information 
campaigns reinforcing the threat and the type of responses that citizens are expected to follow are 
combined with scenario and simulation exercises, overseen by crisis or emergency management 
committees of key actors and the stockpiling of essential goods. The state, as the protector of citizens 
against assumed threats, is the central player, backed up by scientific expertise to justify intervention, 
and a set of technical, managerial and securitised bio-political responses.  
Again, the framing in terms of crisis and emergency enables the suspension of the normal rules of 
democratic control. Preparedness for uncertain crises is thus a state response that supersedes earlier 
approaches to social protection and welfare, targeted at vulnerable groups or population-wide 
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insurance techniques for ensuring health and welfare (Lakoff 2007). As a ‘post-political’ technocratic 
response (cf. Swyngedouw 2011), risk management techniques – and the whole apparatus of expert-
led practices associated with scenarios, simulations and contingency planning – are thereby justified 
and deployed as part of a ‘crisis narrative’, resulting in the undermining of democratic processes (Rayner 
2003; 2007).  
The experience of major disease outbreaks in recent years has questioned the appropriateness of the 
technocratic, securitised, post-political risk framing of disease outbreak preparedness and response in 
the global health system. While not denying the value of globally distributed data collection and 
dissemination along with coordinated early warning and the capacity for preparing for uncertainty 
events, the way such systems have evolved and continue to do so leaves much to be desired. By framing 
the problem in terms of risk, rather than uncertainty and ignorance, and presenting events as event-
driven crises and emergencies, a particular regime has emerged, pivoting on a set of pathogen-centred 
technologies of control, that is central to both early action and response. Such approaches, it has been 
widely shown, do not necessarily generate the most effective results.   
Take the experience of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014–5. Distrust of biomedical and security 
responses has been widely documented, along with the failure to articulate with local ‘cultural logics’ 
and prior experiences of earlier disease episodes, conflict or war (Leach and Hewlett 2010; Wilkinson et 
al. 2017). This resulted in the frequent failure to engage with the practices of, for example, burial 
ceremonies, where rapid transmission often occurred, nor with the livelihood requirements of 
movement to markets and across borders. Where a medical and security response would advocate 
compulsory quarantine, the establishment of treatment centres and the closing of markets and border 
crossings, these were not compatible with people’s lives, even when they recognised the risks at play. 
In the face of uncertainty, people’s reactions were shaped by beliefs and emotions such as fear and 
dread, but also the acceptance of fate and the inevitability of God’s will (Wilkinson et al. 2017).  
In the end, people’s own knowledge and practice shifted the pattern of the West Africa Ebola epidemic, 
resulting in far fewer deaths than the risk models predicted. As Paul Richards (2016: 156) observes, 
‘common sense, improvisation, distributed practical knowledge and collective action are invaluable 
elements in a people’s science of infection control’. Such a ‘people’s science’ contrasts starkly with the 
expert, medicalised knowledge that was the centre of the response in West Africa. People living with 
diseases (or droughts or any other ‘disaster’ for that matter) experience them differently to outsider 
experts and professionals. Sequential learning of unfolding processes, drawing on subjective experience 
and practice-based responses, are always evident. A key lesson is that engaging with culturally 
embedded responses to uncertainty is essential, and this requires a much more attentive, lesson-
learning approach that acknowledges the entwined social-biological nature of disease and so takes local 
knowledge and practices as its starting point (cf. Hinchliffe et al. 2016; Lock and Nguyen 2018).  
4.4. Climate Change, Natural Hazards and Disasters: The Politics of Vulnerability 
Uncertainties are central to forecasting future disasters, whether through long-term impacts of climate 
change or through the impacts of earthquakes, tsunamis, floods or droughts (Thompson and Warburton 
1985; Hough 2002; Handmer and Dovers 2013). A hazard-focused assessment, based on climate or 
seismological modelling, however, is inadequate. Vulnerability to such hazards depends very much on 
social, political and historical factors (Blaikie et al. 2004). In contrast, a political ecology perspective on 
climate and natural disaster impacts points to questions of class, wealth, race, education, gender, age, 
occupation and location, as well as a wider historical, political economy, that affects vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerabilities as such may well emerge from the long-term consequences of marginalisation and 
discrimination, the result of neoliberalisation, financialisation and histories of colonisation or racial 
discrimination (Watts and Bohle 1993; Adger 2006; Perreault et al. 2015).  
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The impact of a flood or earthquake depends on where you live, the quality of your housing and your 
access to resources to escape in time (Butler et al. 2017). Responding to uncertainties requires access 
to assets – material and social – and capabilities, so people can respond effectively and generate safety 
and security. Such capabilities are unevenly distributed, and only some people are able to respond in 
this way. Gaining access to the entitlements – in the sense described by Amartya Sen (1984: 497) as ‘the 
set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights 
and opportunities that he or she faces’ – means attention to institutions as mediators of safe and secure 
livelihoods (Leach et al. 1999).  
Institutions are core to thinking about response to risks and uncertainties (Mehta et al. 1999; Dequech 
2006), and to moving beyond solely an ‘external hazards’ framing. Douglass North (1991) describes 
institutions as the rules of the game and organisations as the players. Therefore, by reinforcing norms 
and facilitating coordination, institutions act to control risks and uncertainties (Douglas 1986b). 
Institutions and organisations may be very local, associated with social networks within a community, 
but they may also relate to wider legal, regulatory and policy spaces. They all affect the opportunity for 
manoeuvre and the nature of vulnerability of different social groups.  
Movement is often an important response to uncertain settings, the result of human–environmental 
interactions, but mobility and migration depend on social, institutional and political conditions, and so 
are not options available to everyone. Experiences of migration are highly differentiated by class, 
gender, ethnicity, education and age (Gertel and Hexel 2018). How different people actively produce 
security in the face of uncertainty must draw on different rules, institutions or wider social relations and 
structures, so linking livelihood opportunities with people’s agency in what Anthony Giddens (1991) 
describes as a process of ‘structuration’. 
As with the case of disease preparedness in the previous section, an entire industry exists for ‘disaster 
risk reduction’, linked to multiple frameworks for ‘resilience’, with international agencies and 
agreements responsible for policy development and implementation. Very often such approaches take 
a hazard-based approach to managing or otherwise mitigating risk and uncertainty. The probabilities of 
a particular disaster event are assessed, again making use of often elaborate modelling techniques, and 
a response system evolves that aims to mitigate or adapt to the risk. The ‘ecological approach’ to 
hazards emphasised the array of natural hazards from floods to droughts to earthquakes (Burton et al. 
1978). Where uncertainties are acknowledged, they are dealt with often through techniques that 
reduce the analysis to a risk assessment or a set of scenarios that offer a range of defined outcomes.  
For example, in the case of earthquakes, the science of seismology is, in the words of Susan Hough 
(2002), often fruitlessly engaged in ‘predicting the unpredictable’. While the International Panel on 
Climate Change now adds uncertainty bars to estimates of climate impact derived from diverse model 
arrays (Aven and Renn 2015), more uncertainties have emerged from any downscaling of global or 
regional models, making any prediction of likely impact difficult (Thornton et al. 2014).  
Processes of financialisation are also resulting in new approaches to respond to uncertainties, especially 
through tools such as insurance. Index-based insurance against the impacts of drought are offered to 
farmers, pastoralists and others as a way of offsetting climate risks (Chantarat et al. 2013; Carter et al. 
2014). Insurance companies pay out when rainfall or some indicator of production goes below a 
threshold. The result is a system that attempts to ‘govern at a distance’ via the market and through a 
set of technologies for assessing impacts and allocating payments; in this way, the approach responds 
to uncertain events, creating a market in risk, available to some but excluding others (Johnson 2013a, 
2013b, 2015; Isakson 2015; Taylor 2016). Such financial products also may be attached to an array of 
conditionalities when linked to state or donor subsidy, as a particular style of ‘resilience building’ is 
promoted (Reeves 2017). This is seen by some as a new ‘rule by experts’ (da Costa 2013), which can 
undermine traditional ‘moral economy’ approaches to managing risk and uncertainty in agrarian 
systems (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Carter et al. 2014). As Marcus Taylor (2016: 237) argues, ‘Ignoring 
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the structural and relational dimensions of risk production leads to an overly technical approach to risk 
management that is wilfully blind to the intersection of risk and social power’. 
Reflecting on the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster, Michael Watts (2016) argues that a pervasive 
commitment to risk management undermined any commitment to a culture of safety. This consequence 
was driven at the frontier of extraction through a corporate strategy focus on containing risk through 
technical means; yet practices of secrecy, concealment and rule-breaking were central to daily practice, 
which exposed the operation to potential disaster. Quoting Foucault, who commented that ‘the motto 
of neoliberalism is “live dangerously”’ (Foucault 2008: 66), Watts argues that a combination of 
aggressive corporate enclosure of resources has been driven by financialised and technological 
approaches to create a series of manufactured risks and accumulated insecurities – all the direct result 
of an extension of neoliberal capitalism into new resource frontiers.  
Uncertainties, risks, ambiguities and forms of ignorance (see Figure 1) are, in other words, constructed 
in relation to social, economic and political orders, not just natural ones. It is this intersection between 
social-political and natural worlds that a political ecology perspective helps us to understand, pointing 
to the wider structural relations that generate incertitude and condition responses. Without such a 
perspective, approaches to climate mitigation and adaptation – or responses to disasters more generally 
– become narrow, managerial and technocratic, and do not identify, let alone address, underlying 
causes (Pelling 2003, 2010; Taylor 2014; Watts 2015; Nightingale 2018).  
******* 
Across the four domains, a number of themes in the literature discussed earlier are evident. Reflections 
on finance and banking highlight the importance of perspectives on socially and culturally embedded 
economies, the social dimensions of network relations and the everyday practices of key actors. Practice 
perspectives are also central to the discussion of generating reliability in critical infrastructures, where 
everyday actions and lesson-learning are essential. The discussion of disease outbreak response and 
preparedness highlights issues of governmentality and bio-politics, a theme highlighted again in 
discussions on disasters, where a focus on social difference and wider structural political features is 
stressed. All cases therefore draw on elements of political, social, cultural, practice-based and individual 
framings of risk and uncertainty, and all required a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding. While 
all cases had resonance with wider framings – for example of a ‘risk society’ – the empirical 
particularities required more nuance, and each emphasised the importance of specific contextual 
understandings. 
5. Understanding Uncertainty: Emerging Cross-Cutting Themes  
Given this necessarily brief exploration of conceptual literatures and empirical cases, what cross-cutting 
themes emerge that help us to define the contours of an approach that takes uncertainty seriously, and 
moves beyond a narrow risk framing? Here I identify four.  
5.1. Challenging Notions of Modernity and Progress 
Various strands of the literature reflect on our understandings of modernity and progress. Uncertainty 
is a recurrent theme in ideas such as the ‘risk society’ and ‘reflexive modernisation’, where risk and 
uncertainty are seen to be the defining features of contemporary societies. Similar themes are 
developed around concepts such as ‘liquid modernity’ and the idea of ‘nomadism’, where societies must 
be understood in relation to rhizomatically connected networks, and the shifting, provisional, 
improvised and mobile identities of people. These and other theorisations of late-modern, post-
industrial ‘northern’ societies construct a particularised and context-specific challenge to modernist 
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visions of linear progress based on technocratic ‘risk management’ and control. As the literature 
demonstrates, there are of course multiple modernities in different contexts, each responding to new 
risks and uncertainties.  
Expanding our horizon to reflections on non-Western societies, other perspectives come into view. 
These include alternative notions of non-linear time, different understandings of the material and non-
material world, culturally specific routes to coping and response, including alternative repertoires of 
emotion, desire and spirituality, and contrasting imaginaries for now and for the future. All these 
analyses suggest that a universalised challenge to control-based, risk approaches is limiting. Simplistic 
frameworks of stylised behaviours – whether grid/group approaches or typologies of risk perception – 
mask a more diverse and rich array of understandings and responses that matter; but never all the time 
in the same way. As the literature reiterates, the ontologies and epistemologies of risk and uncertainty 
are inevitably embedded in histories, cultures and contexts, a theme repeatedly highlighted by the 
domain-specific cases.  
5.2. Rethinking Expertise 
These reflections on societal constructions of ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ in response to risk and 
uncertainty challenge particular notions of science and evidence, and the practices of experts and 
administrators. If we don’t know likelihoods and outcomes, and even more acutely when we don’t even 
know what we don’t know, then conventional, current approaches to planning for the future – and so 
of course innovation, development and notions of the economy – become even more problematic and 
misleading. More science, clearer insights, better plans just may not be the result, as discussions of 
emergency planning and disaster risk management show.  
This has long been recognised of course, but in risk analysis the prospect of clear, probabilistic definition 
based on population statistics was, and is still, held to be the basis for future planning. Health, housing, 
crime or welfare policies were defined through statistical assessments based on actuarial analysis 
revealing the likelihood of a spread of outcomes, around which a policy could be devised. Precautionary 
approaches have emerged in relation to new technologies – whether nuclear facilities or biotechnology 
– particularly in Europe. A precautionary stance assumes the possibility that a negative outcome exists 
and can well happen, where measures are taken to prevent this. This suggests a new relationship 
between science and policy, with new investments in early warning monitoring, appraisal methods and 
early action policy measures (Harremoës et al. 2013). A ‘preparedness’ approach equally accepts the 
uncertainty – even ignorance – of future events, but recognises that – at some undefined point – they 
will likely happen. This means, as discussed earlier, being prepared for the worst, and developing early 
warning, scenario analyses and crisis responses (Lakoff 2017).  
Depending on how uncertainties are defined and how futures are imagined, the relationships among 
expertise, methods, models and analytical frames shift, adjust and even change. With this, the networks 
of scientific experts, technocrats and administrators involved are crucial, as earlier discussions of 
financial networks show. This underscores that different practices and forms of ‘governmentality’ exist 
whether the framing is one of risk management, insurance, precautionary policy or crisis preparedness. 
Acting in an uncertain world (cf. Callon 2009) requires enlisting a range of people and things, whether 
actuarial tables, emergency protocols or economic, climate or disease models, as discussed earlier in 
relation to both disease outbreak and climate and disaster response. Dealing with ‘mess’ and so 
generating reliability in the face of uncertainty is an active process, operating in real time, and involving 
a range of often tacit, experiential skills and techniques, as discussed in relation to critical infrastructures 
above (Roe 2013). In other words, the assumptions for any formal scientific-bureaucratic process of risk 
management or preparedness planning must be understood to differ significantly from what actually 
happens, whether the context is avoiding accidents happening within critical infrastructures or the 
securing of reliable outputs in a dryland pastoral system.  
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5.3. Taking Social Difference and Political Context Seriously   
Risks and uncertainties are experienced by and through different people, depending on who they are, 
where they live, how rich they are and their abilities to respond to uncertain events, shocks and stresses. 
This is more than individual or group perceptions, as defined through the ‘psychometric paradigm’. For 
sure, perceptions differ depending on whether the prospect of catastrophe is large or small, or whether 
people have different individual predispositions towards certain types of event (Pidgeon 2008). But how 
this is experienced and understood, and what impacts it has, depends much more on underlying 
structures of vulnerability, affected by history, political economy and social position.  
As discussed in relation to a political framing of uncertainty (and emphasised again in the discussion of 
the political ecology of disasters and climate risk), class, race, gender, age and more are all dimensions 
that affect whether uncertainties are ones that can be coped with, or indeed turned into affordances. 
Living with or from uncertainties depends on who you – and others – are. Processes of globalisation, 
neoliberal restructuring and financialisation processes change these dynamics, creating new patterns of 
vulnerability and possibility in their wake.  
Indeed, such processes ‘manufacture’ uncertainty, generating new risks, but also possibilities, that are 
unevenly experienced. As the environmental justice literature makes clear, many environmental risks 
are experienced substantially more by marginalised poor people, including people of colour, living in 
exposed locations (Cutter 1995). A focus on capabilities, entitlements and differentiated livelihoods is 
necessarily an important complement to an emphasis on the construction of risk and uncertainty by 
different actors through different narratives.  
5.4 Rethinking the Governance of Risk and Uncertainty  
The discussions so far in this paper clearly have very significant implications for governance. When the 
future is uncertain, the game has to change. The standard approaches of technocratic, control-oriented 
planning do not – indeed cannot – work. While this lesson is more widely accepted than before, the 
myths of control persist. This is after all what the ‘rule of experts’ (Mitchell 2002) requires. Visions of 
modernisation and progress, in some important respects, rely on this persistence; otherwise, so the fear 
has it, anything goes. But the alternative to control is not anarchic chaos; rather it is potentially a more 
collective, caring, convivial approach (cf. llich 1973; de la Bellacasa 2017). In The Way of Ignorance, the 
novelist, poet and activist farmer, Wendell Berry (2005: ix-x), makes the case for one such approach:  
Because ignorance is… a part of our creaturely definition, we need an appropriate way: a way 
of ignorance, which is the way of neighborly love, kindness, caution, care, appropriate scale, 
thrift, good work, right livelihood…The way of ignorance, therefore, is to be careful, to know 
the limits and the efficacy of our knowledge. It is to be humble and to work on an appropriate 
scale. 
Such an approach requires an attentiveness to context and the ability to keep all manner of dissonance 
and difference in motion without feeling compelled to come to an immediate decision. This in turn 
requires deliberation among different unknown options, and a more careful, democratic attention to 
what different views entail and their implications across different groups of people. In this 
transformational vision, notions of justice are central, and a more patient, sometimes unruly, bottom-
up approach to defining future pathways is essential (Stirling 2015; Scoones et al. 2018). Any such 
approach would embrace uncertainty centrally, and make discussions explicit when unknown 
likelihoods and outcomes are evident, as they almost always are.  
In the previous sections, various ‘governance’ approaches have been mentioned that accept 
uncertainty. Adaptive management and polycentric governance, importantly, underscore incremental 
learning and altering course when new knowledge about socio-ecological system dynamics emerges, as 
it inevitably does. Navigating towards increased system resilience must involve recognising and using 
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‘windows of opportunity’, drawing on novel ideas from different sources, with leadership involving ‘the 
ability to span scales of governance, orchestrate networks, integrate and communicate understanding, 
and reconcile different problem domains’ (Olsson et al. 2006: 1).  
Similarly, experimentalist approaches to governance, widely seen as important in the European context, 
suggest the need to test out different options and learn from them, adapting responses (cf. Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2010). Adaptations, improvisations and experiments may occur at local levels, while, as in the 
case of Chinese policy processes, an overall direction is given (Schoon 2014; Heilman 2018). Notions of 
‘guided improvisation’ (Ang 2016) or ‘conceded informality’, along with trial-and-error (Husain 2017), 
become central to a pragmatic approach to addressing uncertainty and complexity (Ansell and Geyer 
2017). 
Even such approaches, however, can retain a technocratic, expert-led direction, excluding wider 
deliberations and unruly challenge under the banner of ‘keep it simple!’ Depending on how 
uncertainties are framed, and who is expected to respond to them, the relationships between the state, 
experts and citizens not only can be quite different, but also must be different, given so much can and 
does matter across scales of governance. Sadly, many of the projects on adaptive resilience planning (or 
equivalent) being rolled out across drought-vulnerable areas in Africa, for example, often echo the 
project-directed approaches that preceded them (cf. Côte and Nightingale 2012; Walsh-Dilley et al. 
2013; Welsh 2014; Felli 2016; Scott-Smith 2018).  
In the same way, adaptive management of ecosystems may accept that uncertainty and learning are 
important, but may be geared to the ultimate outcomes of previous top-down ecosystem management 
and conservation projects. Neither the European Union advocating experimentalist approaches for 
energy policy nor the Chinese state promoting ‘directed improvisation’ around rangeland policy will 
allow a more inclusive, deliberative, and so challenging and disruptive, process to emerge that offers 
routes to defining and responding to uncertainties. In sum, politics matters, and adaptive, experimental 
governance without democratic politics, can end up similar to earlier expert modes – even when 
uncertainties are recognised, and are indeed central.  
6. Conclusion 
So, what to do? As a review of ideas, insights and experiences, this paper is not aimed at providing 
prescriptions; perhaps, though, some broader implications for action can be drawn out despite the 
obvious limitations of a survey approach. This conclusion is a first attempt. 
 
One of the most significant conclusions echoes a much-repeated quote from Albert Einstein: ‘The 
problems that exist in the world today,’ he argued, ‘cannot be solved by the level of thinking that created 
them.’3 There clearly has to be a lot of unlearning by key actors in order to take on new ways of thinking 
and doing required to embrace uncertainty. This includes, as we have seen, rejecting a narrowing down 
to risk approaches for appraisal; taking history, political economy and social difference seriously when 
acting upon uncertainty’s impacts; and challenging the reversion to technocratic type in new forms of 
governance, among many others.  
 
Shifting frames and changing practice are not easy, and are very challenging to incumbent institutions, 
disciplines and professional practices. This is in part because of deeply embedded ways of thinking that 
have become dominant in Western societies. More recently, these have been exported via neo-
                                                          
3 http://www.alberteinsteinsite.com/quotes/einsteinquotes.html  
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colonialism, aid projects and educational programmes across the world, linked to powerful, hegemonic 
institutions that replicate particular views and practices.  
 
Underpinned by a Cartesian, mechanical, linear worldview, the rationalist, individualist approach that 
so dominates a ‘risk’ framing – and has become central to core policy disciplines, including economics – 
is of course not the only philosophical perspective available. As we have also seen, there are many 
lessons to be learned from others, both insiders and outsiders, who have grappled with uncertainty, 
making use of practical, experiential knowledge. Almost by definition, any all-embracing meta-theory 
will be elusive. Just as the ‘risk society’ thesis proved limiting, confined in its grander claims to particular 
contexts and moments in history, so would any other attempt.  
 
That said, by drawing across contextualised, located experiences, and reflecting on the emerging 
perspectives elaborated above, we can nevertheless identify some pointers to a more useful way of 
thinking about uncertainty. This advice and ways forward are not universal and will always vary 
depending on setting, but a commonality is evident. Based on the cross-cutting themes sketched above, 
six tentative suggestions for the task ahead are offered below:  
 Embracing uncertainty means drawing on diverse knowledges, coming from different sources. 
Different styles of knowledge-making must be combined for effective responses, which 
requires a combination of formal and informal, accredited and lay knowledge and experiential 
and conceptual understandings (Wynne 1996; Agrawal 1995; Scoones and Thompson 1994), 
where forms of ‘citizen science’ become important in addressing uncertainties in context 
through culturally embedded, experiential learning (Irwin 2002; Leach et al. 2005). 
 When knowledge about the world cannot be easily settled by the imposition of a particular 
style of expertise, or a probabilistic risk perspective, then knowledge about the future and 
what to do about it become inevitably more contested. Dissonance, conflict, dissensus and 
contention are the keywords. Such recognition requires the fostering of practices and 
institutions that enhance open, inclusive deliberation (Holmes and Scoones 2000), rooted in 
cooperative, mutualistic and networked relations (Stirling 2019). This is especially important 
for complex, controversial, ‘wicked’ problems, where uncertainties take centre-stage, as 
hierarchical, stratified and competitive social-political orders are frequently poor at 
responding to diverse uncertainties. The need for flexibility and the appreciation of diverse 
knowledges, values and views also require both attention and openness to the emotional and 
affective dimensions in thinking about narratives that provide alternatives (Tuckett 2018; 
Beckert and Bronk 2018), including creative approaches to visualisation, multi-media 
engagement and narrative storytelling. 
 Diverse people experience and respond to uncertainties differently. The underlying 
vulnerabilities that generate risks and uncertainties, as well as ambiguities and ignorance, 
require acknowledgement and assessment of the interplay of class, gender, generation, race, 
ethnicity, sexuality, occupation, education or location (Ribot 2014; Watts 2016). Such 
dimensions of difference intersect to influence how uncertainties are experienced subjectively 
and how responses and opportunities are conditioned. Accepting this complexity affords fresh 
ways of seeing and differentiating a difficult problem, case by case. 
 Governing uncertainty means rejecting the narrowing down to singular solutions. Diversity is 
the watchword, not harmonisation and convergence (Bronk and Jacoby 2016). The analytic 
imperative in addressing uncertainty is always: look for the differences that matter. 
Differentiating means avoiding reduced-form, simplifying crisis narratives – such as ‘the global 
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financial crisis’ or stark versions of ‘environmental catastrophe’ – and instead identifying and 
encouraging local complexities and contextualised solutions.  
 Embracing uncertainty requires a sensitive approach to improvisation and experimentation 
that offers choice. Key is the question: uncertainty with respect to what? Issues of power and 
agency inevitably arise, posing the question: governance of what for whom? Too often 
conventional, modernist solutions advocating resilience-building or adaptive management – 
notionally responding to complexity and uncertainty – remain directed towards implementing 
expert-led solutions. A shift in governance thinking and practice is therefore required from 
creating experimental ‘subjects’ to facilitating the emergence of experimental ‘citizens’, who 
can engage with uncertainties and their implications in context (Evans et al. 2016; Stilgoe 
2016; Laakso et al. 2017; Jones and Whitehead 2018). Empowering citizens with the ability to 
exercise influence on the form and direction of interventions will therefore help to generate 
new pathways that embrace uncertainty (Leach et al. 2010). 
 With diverse sources and origins of knowledge constructing uncertainty, a more open, 
networked and transdisciplinary approach is required. Here too, differences matter. 
Transdisciplinarity involves scientists, practitioners, policymakers, activists and others working 
together on shared problems. Such transdisciplinary processes require confronting diverse 
framings, addressing conflicts over values and politics, and seeking alternatives collaboratively 
(Scoones et al. 2018; Temper et al. 2018; Marshall et al. 2018; Charli-Joseph et al. 2018). A 
profession’s strengths can also be its blind-spots, such that humility, reflexivity and openness 
are required for the processes to go beyond instrumental participation (Chilvers 2008; Chilvers 
and Evans 2009; Chilvers and Kearnes 2015; Dryzek and Pickering 2017).  
All of these themes challenge, often in very fundamental ways, the dominant ‘risk framing’ that has 
constructed the mainstream view of science, modernity and progressive change. They highlight the 
importance of taking knowledge politics seriously, viewing uncertainty as subjective, constructed 
knowledge, contrasting across individuals and groups. They further suggest very different implications 
across class, gender, race and social difference more broadly. All, in turn, suggest challenges to the 
practices of democracy that are required to open up and broaden out debates about uncertainty 
(Stirling 2008a). 
6.1. Lessons From ‘The Margins’? 
This review has arrived at this point from a reflection on a wide range of existing literatures. That said, 
the sources have been written in English in largely academic formats, even if across diverse academic 
disciplines and domains of practice. Much of the critical literature is framed around a challenge to 
modernist thinking and Western notions of progress.  
But what if this learning was reversed, and we started not from a critique of established intellectual 
traditions, but from a more practical, experiential standpoint? Would learning from those who live with, 
by and from uncertainty – dryland cultivators, fisherfolk, pastoralists, as well as control room operators, 
trading floor agents and disaster risk managers – result in a different set of perspectives? Would the 
categorisation of concepts, themes and critiques look the same?  
In the PASTRES project, we aim to learn lessons ‘from the margins’ – in this case pastoral areas in 
Sardinia, Tibet and northern Kenya – and to link these to wider understandings, exploring dissonances 
as well as connections. Responding to a naïve outsider’s question about uncertainty, a Tibetan herder 
in the Qinghai region of China reflected: ‘the past is gone, the present is happening, but you can’t know 
the future. That is uncertainty (ngemed).’ Meanwhile, in a discussion with pastoralist elders in northern 
Kenya, one observed:  
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We don’t know the future, and what it will bring. Only God can know the future. Our 
grandfathers made predictions [using animal entrails], but we cannot know. But uncertainties 
are here now. That’s our life! We used to have drought every five years, now it’s every two. We 
are being squeezed by outsiders from all sides.  
In both instances, uncertainty was linked to wider understandings of destiny and culturally defined 
notions of the future, as well as an appreciation of how this influences everyday practices. Equally, the 
contexts for both the understandings of and the responses to uncertainty were emphasised. 
Marginalisation through being ‘squeezed by outsiders’, as well as the consequences of wider economic 
and environmental change, were all part of the discussions. People with long experience of living with 
uncertainties articulate a perspective that contrasted with technically defined ideas of risk and 
uncertainty.  
Reflecting on pastoralists’ perspectives is not aimed at uncovering a set of somehow pre-modern ideas 
to be juxtaposed with those of the ‘risk society’, for example. This is not about transfer or exchange in 
a conventional sense, where ‘indigenous’ knowledge becomes ‘useful’ for others, and can be 
appropriated and exported. Instead, our aim in the PASTRES project is a more vigilant, attentive and 
humble appreciation of similarity, yet difference. Can we learn from those often labelled as outsiders to 
Western norms – pastoralists on the margins, for example – or not recognised by normal organisational 
theories – such as the control room operators? And do the sometimes unruly, unconventional and 
improvised perspectives help us to challenge conventional thinking and practice?  
As Bruno Latour (2012) argues, ‘we have never been modern’, and there is much more symmetry in 
understanding and perspective than is often assumed. Brian Wynne argues (1996) that science has 
always been ‘indeterminate, formulaic and uncertain’, and farmers – and other publics – did not trust 
institutions of uncertainty long before the advent of so-called ‘reflexive modernity’. If we have always 
lived in a ‘risk society’, then clearly it looks different from different standpoints, and those differences 
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What is Uncertainty  
and Why Does it Matter?
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Uncertainty defines our times. Whether it is in relation to 
climate change, disease outbreaks, financial volatility, natural 
disasters or political settlements, every media headline 
seems to assert that things are uncertain, and increasingly so. 
Uncertainty, where we do not know the probabilities of either 
likelihoods or outcomes, is different to risk, the implications 
of which are explored in this paper through five different ways 
of thinking about uncertainty, derived from highly diverse 
literatures encompassing societal, political, cultural, practice 
and individual perspectives.
The paper continues by examining how these  
perspectives relate to four domains: finance and banking; 
critical infrastructures; disease outbreaks and climate 
change; natural hazards and disasters. Reflecting on these 
experiences, the paper argues that embracing uncertainty 
raises some fundamental challenges. It means questioning 
simple, linear perspectives on modernity and progress.  
It means rethinking expertise and including diverse 
knowledges in deliberations about the future. It means 
understanding how uncertainties emerge in social, political 
and economic contexts, and how uncertainties affect 
different people, depending on class, gender, race, age  
and other dimensions of social difference. And, if 
uncertainty is not reducible to probabilistic risk, it means a 
radically different approach to governance; one that rejects 
control-oriented, technocratic approaches in favour of 
more tentative, adaptive, hopeful and caring responses. 
The paper concludes by asking whether we can learn  
from those who live with and from uncertainty – including 
pastoralists in marginal settings – as part of a wider 
conversation about embracing uncertainties to meet  
the challenges of our turbulent world. 
